Race and Universality: Meillassoux Meets Eze and Wiredu by Martinon, Jean-Paul
 
1 
Jean-Paul Martinon - Race and Universality: Meillassoux Meets Eze and Wiredu 
 
Abstract 
 
This essay focuses on the tension between the need for a notion of universality that would 
abolish all concepts of race and the need to respect the violent history of races and the 
narratives and discourses that have been produced to this day in their name. In order to 
address this issue, this paper argues that the tension cannot be resolved or negotiated without 
a radical change—provoked by the work of Emmanuel Eze, Kwasi Wiredu and Quentin 
Meillassoux—in the interpretation of universality. This radical change is brought on by a 
reformulation of the principle of non-contradiction, the only principle that can potentially 
sustain in harmony and therefore without tension both universality and race. 
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Introduction 
 
One of Emmanuel Eze’s main questions in his book, Achieving our Humanity: The 
Idea of the Postracial Future is this: how is one to negotiate the tension between on the one 
hand, the call for a generic universality applicable to all humans irrespective of races and, on 
the other, the need to respect the singular identities created by the history of races and the 
black race, in particular? The tension is not so much about equality versus difference, but 
about the future prospect of both race and universality in general. In other words, Eze asks, 
how is the tension between the two going to be resolved in the future? Eze answers quickly 
and without ambiguity: ‘In a world such as ours, only the ethics of universal will do.’1 As this 
concise statement clearly shows, Eze therefore asserts the moral imperative for a universality 
that would eventually, in the future, structure humanity as a whole, thus finally cancelling out 
all racial differences. This is the only rightful universality foreseeable today. There cannot be 
another future.  
 
As such, Eze diligently follows in the footsteps of many illustrious predecessors who 
have called for an absolute equality and freedom for all people irrespective of their races 
from, for example, Frederick Douglass’s call for a human brotherhood,2 via Martin Luther 
King’s dream that, one day, race becomes a signpost from the past, all the way to Achille 
Mbembe who recently called for a culturally plural world of ‘passers-by’ who know not what 
race is.3 If we therefore accomplish such a longed-for future, then, as Eze says, ‘what future 
is left for race? My own answer: none.’4 
 
As such, Eze’s assertive answer is yet again an exercise in hope in seeing one day a 
universality applicable to all. If one didn’t know of his formidably rationalist analyses of race 
                                                      
1 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Achieving our Humanity: The Idea of the Postracial Future (London: Routledge, 
2001), 180. 
2 Frederick Douglass, ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?’ in The Frederick Douglass Papers I-2, ed. John 
W. Blassingame (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 387. 
3 Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, trans. Laurent Dubois (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 
124. 
4 Eze, Achieving our Humanity, 180. 
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and reason, one could easily perceive Eze, through these statements, as an idealist in as much 
as he hopes to place this universality as the telos not only of all racial conflict, but of history 
as well. There cannot be in the future a world structured, for example, by a diaspora of 
absolutes, a strict division of races living in isolation, separated by walls, genetic engineering, 
or segregated by customs or laws. Universality is the only rational outcome of the fights and 
struggles of today, the only future in which the dichotomous relation between the same and 
the other finally vanishes. Eze doesn’t shy away from this idealist hope. He even goes as far 
as saying: ‘It is… like practicing to live in service of a particular future.’5 
 
And yet, at the same time, Eze also insists that African thought in particular, must also 
stand firm on history as a way of bringing about this universal telos to fruition. The aim of 
this insistence is to highlight that in parallel to and in support of this universal telos, African 
and black sensibilities and modes of experiences in general must also be preserved and 
defended. This is not just a call to preserve a tradition, a culture, a heritage, a genetic make-
up, or an essence (a pan- or diasporic African identity, for example), but a strong 
commitment to history and to the outcomes and perspectives it has generated. As he says,  
 
‘what must be sought is a stronger commitment to history. A commitment to modern 
history in general—and to an open-textured understanding of black racial memory (not a 
biological racial essence)—provides a sound basis for philosophical criticism of black 
history as well as a basis for an ethically informed economic and cultural critique of anti-
black racism.’6  
 
If one takes on board these two ethical ideals, it is then clear that for Eze, the future is 
structured not with one imperative, but two: the universal and the particular. In other words, 
for him, it is crucial that we not only abide to a universal principle but also, at the same time, 
that we protect the history that led to the creation of the black race, its various meanings and 
its many cultural incarnations. This is perhaps what makes Eze’s attempt to think this tension 
so remarkable. Instead of simply seeking an absolute universality full stop, Eze emphasizes 
the importance of the universal in a situation in which we can no longer erase the history of 
races. Hence his careful and yet critical reading of Kwasi Wiredu’s Cultural Universals and 
Particulars, for which, there is, on the one hand, a need for universality and on the other, an 
assertion of particularity, the two carefully tied together. Ultimately, Eze’s aim is to show 
that there should be a universality that identify us all as a species of bipeds and on the other, 
there should also be cultural particulars that not only cannot be denied, but also must be 
defended so as to avoid dangerous relativistic and ethnocentric interpretations of humanity. 
 
But the question beckons: if one sets aside—if this is at all possible—the issue of 
particulars, then what does Eze mean when he talks of a universality as the only ethical hope 
for humanity? What does Wiredu himself has in mind when he talks of a universal that would 
accommodate the particularities of races and their histories? As these questions show, the aim 
of this paper is not to focus on the tension between universality and particularity or unity and 
diversity, but on the definition of universality. The aim is therefore not to formulate a 
theoretical or socio-political resolution, here and now, of Eze’s tension between the 
suppression and/or defence of race, but to put forward an analysis of the very idea of 
universality in relation to the question of race. As will become clear, this idea of universality 
                                                      
5 Eze, Achieving our Humanity, 181. 
6 Eze, Achieving our Humanity, 206. 
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is neither a utopian “nature” that would relativize all particular identities nor an ideal “order” 
that would bring together everyone under one denomination. The idea of universality sought 
after is most simply an unquestionable fact free of conditional referents and therefore strong 
enough to withstand all forms of relativism.  
 
In order to address this thorny issue, I will start first by looking at the way Eze and 
Wiredu address the question of universality through the Aristotelian principle of non-
contradiction, this undisputed fact that, for them, overcomes all forms of utopian and idealist 
universalities. By honing in on their Aristotelian definition as the basis for their universality, 
the aim is not to evaluate the social or political import of their arguments and therefore of its 
potential applicability in the future, but to simply assess the idea of using such a principle in 
this context. I will then proceed by altering this interpretation of universality through a 
reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s own interpretation of the principle. This second reading 
does not constitute an introduction to Meillassoux’s work, an attempt to critically evaluate his 
work in relation to other notions of universality, or a way of evaluating the political potential 
of his ideas in the context of race studies.7 The aim is simply to re-evaluate Eze and Wiredu’s 
take on the principle through Meillassoux’s work. The hope with this juxtaposition of 
readings is simply to rethink the idea of universality anew, anchoring it so that it is finally 
able to truly accommodate the much-needed defence of race. 
 
 
1. Eze, Wiredu and the Principle of Non-Contradiction 
 
Contrary to what one might expect, neither Eze nor Wiredu analyse the idea of 
universality from the perspective of a global identity or personhood. If they had, they would 
have ended up with the same kinds of arguments one can already find in Hegel, for which 
universality is basically that which is identical to all human beings and as such can only be 
turned into a global spectre (or Spirit) made up of the many ethnic, social, and cultural views 
it purports to transcend. Universality would then end up being yet another overarching 
identity (idem) that would define itself over and against particular ones (ipse), thus preserving 
itself as a kind of hegemonic totality—such as, for example, the supra-identity implied in 
universal human rights—always in need of redefinition.8 And they probably would have 
ended up with the same kinds of arguments put forward, for example, by Judith Butler or 
Ernest Laclau, for whom, universality is ultimately an emergence that no one can either glory 
in it (as western cultures are prone to do) or claim as equally theirs (as all other cultures and 
minorities tend to do).9 Neither Eze nor Wiredu fall for such an easy conceptualisation of the 
universal as this trans-global ‘not yet’ or emerging ‘to-come’ never truly fulfilled or 
achieved. On the contrary, they carefully avoid such totalizing gestures to focus exclusively, 
as we will see, on the delicate and difficult tension between logic and biology.  
 
Eze indeed says that, for Wiredu, one of the most basic and clearest form of universal 
is neither a cultural overarching global identity nor a metaphysical floating signifier such as 
                                                      
7 For an introduction to Meillassoux’s work, see, for example, Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: 
Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). 
8 On this topic and with a special focus on Hegel and Marx’s understanding of universality as hegemony, see 
Etienne Balibar, ‘Sub specie universitatis,’ trans. Ermanno Bencivenga, in Topoi 25:1-2 (September 2006), 3-
16. 
9 Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000). 
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‘human nature,’ but, most simply, the principle of non-contradiction as an intrinsic and 
inalienable characteristic of human thought. In classical logic, this principle is the second of 
the three laws of thought, the other two being the law of excluded middle and the law of 
identity.10 Ignoring the first and last laws, Eze and Wiredu simply state that the principle of 
non-contradiction is a trait of formal logic applicable to all humans endowed with even the 
most basic language. In this, they faithfully follow Aristotle’s account in Book Gamma of 
Metaphysics that the principle of non-contradiction is independent of any specific ethno-
socio-cultural content or linguistic specification and is therefore self-evidently11 universal. 
This principle is stated thus: 
 
‘It is not possible for the same thing at the same time both to be and not to be.’12 
 
This is Aristotle’s classic formulation of the principle of non-contradiction. It is a modal 
proposition13 declaring that it is not possible for something to have a property and not to have 
it at the same time and in the same manner. So the universal principle that both Eze and 
Wiredu refer to is very much an indubitable fact of human thought. As Eze writes, clearly 
referencing the particularity of the universal and cleverly narrowing down the scope of the 
principle to a simple epistemic issue: ‘When he tries to show the universality of the Akan 
bio-spiritual wisdom, Wiredu… draws the conclusion that the ‘law of non-contradiction’ is a 
prime example of universal norm regulating the human mind.’14 There cannot therefore be a 
more basic trait: the principle of non-contradiction is applicable to all humans endowed with 
thought. 
 
Strangely, while he seems to agree with Wiredu that this principle is a true universal, 
Eze does not define or explore it as such. Instead, he moves swiftly to Wiredu’s applicability 
of this principle not just to a question of language and thought amongst humans, but to a 
question of ontology.15 In doing so, both Eze and Wiredu again conform to the Aristotelian 
argument that immediately ties the principle of non-contradiction to being: a being is a non-
contradiction because it cannot be and not be at the same time.16 In this way, the universality 
of the principle is not just the result of a particularity of the human mind, which would then 
render it prone to all forms of relativisms or paraconsistent logic,17 it is the axiom of being 
qua being.  
                                                      
10 The law of excluded middle states that for any proposition, either it is true or its negation is true. No third 
possibility is given. The law of identity states that whatever is, is. One major reason prevents me from analyzing 
these two complementary facets of logic: it will lead me to analyse the principle of non-contradiction in relation 
to truth (in relation to the ‘either/or’ dilemma and the equation truth = idem). I can only leave the question of 
truth for another time, preferring to focus here on the principle of non-contradiction and universality. 
11 The self-evidence of the principle is famously demonstrated by Aristotle with a Socratic elenchus showing 
that anyone who refutes the principle de facto accepts the principle. Without anyone able to refute it, the 
principle is thus self-evidently universal. 
12 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1005b, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Classics, 1998), 88. 
13 I understand Aristotle’s principle as a ‘modal proposition’ because it relates to the mode of being (possible, 
impossible, necessary, contingent, etc.) and not to a sameness (beingness, for example). For a classic—and 
thereby Platonic—interpretation of the universal as an ideal, see Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, 
trans. J.N. Finlay (London: Routledge, 1970). 
14 Eze, Achieving our Humanity, 200. 
15 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1996), 23. 
16 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1006b, 90. 
17 As Wiredu says, ‘Without this principle, there would be no telling when a message is affirmed or denied…’ 
Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, 38. 
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However, unlike the Aristotelian model, both Eze and Wiredu tie this now onto-
logical principle to a surprising biological evolutionary format. Eze writes: 
 
‘But the crucial objective is that Wiredu wishes to show how this universal law of non-
contradiction is also a biologically grounded fact for all humans. Relying on [John] 
Dewey, this picture of genetic foundations of logic, which governs the law of non-
contradiction, was drawn… [through] “habit,” and habit, in this regard, form the biological 
basis of organic learning.’18 
 
The principle of non-contradiction is thus not only logically and ontologically sound; it is 
also the very evidence of the way human beings came to be biologically; how they evolved 
over millennia from a basic system of stimuli and response against an environment to a 
complex thinking-being organism for whom ‘habit’ is the essential non-contradictory 
structuring process. By linking it to a biological evolutionary format, Eze and Wiredu thus 
interpret the principle of non-contradiction, beyond Aristotle, so that it becomes an 
immutable time-spanning19 structuring bio-onto-logical property regulating the evolution of 
humans themselves. 
 
And yet, like human beings themselves, the principle of non-contradiction is also 
curiously subject to the contingent, death and what cannot be anticipated or predicted. There 
would be no human being and therefore no universal principle without this crucial corollary 
condition that can potentially jeopardise everything. As Wiredu himself recognizes, ‘[the 
principle’s] sufficiency, is, of course, not a sufficient condition for our future survival, but 
only a necessary one, for there are obvious contingencies that could compromise that 
prospect.’20 We touch here on a crucial aspect of Eze and Wiredu’s universal, one for which 
the principle is still at the mercy of the ‘other’ understood not spatially, but temporally. In 
order to posit itself as A and most importantly in order to persist over time as A, the principle 
necessarily needs to pitch itself temporally in relation to the contingent and what can 
potentially jeopardise everything. The validity of the principle then rests on this temporal 
propensity that, in negation, allows it to remain A and not non-A. For example, in order to 
maintain myself alive, I can only sustain myself negatively as not dead yet. In other words, 
by positing myself as not-dead-yet, I remain the embodiment of the principle of non-
contradiction. This is the necessary structure of a universal principle stubbornly pitched 
logically, biologically and ontologically across short, long, or potentially infinite time spans.  
 
So there you are. Through Eze and Wiredu, we have secured a universal principle that 
can be applied to all human beings, that coheres simply as a bio-onto-logical fact that 
                                                      
18 Eze, Achieving our Humanity, 201. 
19 I realise the expression ‘an immutable time-spanning property’ might generate a problem with regards to time 
which can be summarized in this way: Aristotle’s principle focuses on a simultaneity (‘at the same time’) to 
reveal an ontological fact. Turning this simultaneity into an immutable time-spanning property, as Eze and 
Wiredu suggest, diffuses it to the point where it no longer makes sense, that is, to the point where the 
simultaneity itself merges into the overarching time-span of the universe. However, as this essay attempts to 
show, the issue is precisely the problematic reduction of this simultaneity to an arbitrary bio-onto-logical given 
raised to the status of universality. In other words, the aim here is to show that it must be possible to think 
universality without necessarily tethering it to a type of Hegelian consciousness that curiously manages to 
extend itself beyond its time and place. For the way Meillassoux himself addresses the problem of Aristotle’s 
simultaneity, see below, fn. 46. 
20 Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, 38. 
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nothing, except contingency or death itself can jeopardise. And through them, we have also 
secured a universal that is neither alien to the particular nor unable to accommodate the 
formation of racial identities as inherited archives, cultures and discourses. The universal is 
precisely a fundamental principle that notwithstanding races, their histories and identities, 
persists across the ages, unifying and unquestionable. Thus secured, we can then now all 
hope, like Eze, for this universal that finally knows no forms of racialism or racism precisely 
because it rests on the most basic common trait amongst thinking humans, a trait that helps us 
ultimately, to survive and persevere (through ‘habit’) right into the future. It all looks then 
pretty-straight forward.  
 
But is it? Can one think of a universal in this way? There is something nagging about 
this bio-onto-logical universal that operates at all times across the centuries. The nagging 
aspect is perhaps the fact that the principle resembles Heraclitus’s universal becoming, a 
perpetual flux that structures itself in relation to death and what cannot be anticipated. How 
can a universal, one which necessarily pitches itself as a negative (i.e. it is clearly A and not 
non-A or not-dead yet) also structures itself in relation to non-existence and the future utterly 
unforeseeable? If it were truly universal, would it not then incorporate both of these, thus 
expanding its non-contradiction on everything and this everywhere and for all times? In other 
words, would this seemingly self-evident universal not also necessarily contain in its negative 
positing all that it negates (i.e. what is already dead, what does not yet exist, as well as what 
cannot be envisaged or predicted) thus stabilizing it in its full sovereignty for all eternity? 
Once again, how can something strictly universal, something that structures survival 
everywhere and for everyone endowed with sensory receptors and/or thought, know an 
exception such as death and an incalculable future? And finally, doesn’t the finite character of 
this evolutionary universal contradict the inalienable necessity of its eternity? 
 
It seems to me that by tying Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction to an biological 
evolutionary scheme, Eze and Wiredu basically put forward not a principle of non-
contradiction whereby A and non-A are always mutually exclusive, but a principle of 
contradiction instead, whereby A is always already potentially non-A because it contains 
within it, as part of its very constitution, everything that makes it non-A, being deadnon-
existing, or unforeseeable, for example.21 In other words, Eze and Wiredu’s universal is 
really a principle understood as a constancy that can die, an immutability susceptible to 
change, a fixed unity open to the contingent. Douglass’s optimism, King’s dream, Eze’s hope, 
Wiredu’s aspiration, or Mbembe’s plan for passers-by are really empty yearnings because by 
being appended to bio-onto-logy, these universals will always already be in potentia that 
which they are not, Heraclitean contradictions unfolding themselves as contradictions.22 At 
its most reductive—and this is what counts here above all—this is what universality 
effectively means: something that can never be altered or even challenged because it is both 
what ‘is’ and ‘is not,’ what ‘was’ and ‘will become.’ Fixed and yet in flux, Eze and Wiredu’s 
bio-onto-logical universal is effectively a contradiction that cancels the true universality it 
stands for, precisely because of its ‘changing immutability.’ 
 
 
                                                      
21 This does not support dialetheists’ views. Contrary to logic, ‘becoming’ is contradictory because of its 
temporal structure. For a defense of Aristotle’s principle as a metaphysical and not logical principle, see Tuomas 
E. Tahko, ‘The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle,’ in Australian Journal of Logic 7 
(2009), 32-47. 
22 Heraclitus, Fragments, # 36, 57, 59, trans. Bruce Haxton (London: Viking, 2001). 
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2. Meillassoux and the Principle of Non-Contradiction 
 
In order to sustain the argument that Eze and Wiredu put forward a universal 
understood as a principle of contradiction that cannot be universal strictly speaking and 
explore a potentially universal non-contradiction that might be free of conditional referents 
and therefore strong enough to withstand all forms of relativism, I need to turn here to 
Quentin Meillassoux and his own analyses of logic and temporality and his rejection of 
Heraclitean becoming and of its many avatars (Deleuze, for example23). Choosing 
Meillassoux at this juncture is not a way of bringing yet another white European philosopher 
to propound and explain a conception of universality, like Heidegger’s anti-biologist Volk24 
or Sartre’s singulier universel,25 for example. It is a way of agreeing unreservedly with both 
Eze and Wiredu that what is at stake when it comes to universality is indeed a principle of 
non-contradiction, but that the logic and temporality of this principle must be thought through 
before claiming universality as such.  
 
Refuting the idea that there can be an immutable and yet changing universal 
acceptable by all across time (i.e. a flux structuring itself in relation to the contingent, death 
and the unforeseeable), Meillassoux writes: 
 
‘Imagine or rather try to conceive what a being able to support any contradiction would 
be: it has the property A and at the same time and in exactly the same conditions, it has the 
property not-A… Now, try to conceive that this entity has to change—to become 
something it is not—would it be conceivable? Of course not, it is already everything and 
its contrary.’26 
 
With this straightforward description of a contradiction, the very dream of a universal 
understood as a Heraclitean becoming thus gets shattered. For a universal to take place in 
perfect immutability across time, it would indeed not only need to be everything that it is not, 
it would also have to be everything that it can become.27 The principle of contradiction is thus 
an absolute fixed across time that knows no outside, no other because it always already 
absorbs everything, including the contingent, death and the absolutely unforeseeable. As 
such, Eze and Wiredu’s post-racial universal, is not so much a disguised inter-galactic 
fascism in as much as it would exclude all others—including those to-come—but a 
                                                      
23 See amongst other, Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), especially 23-4. 
24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1962) § 
74. 
25 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘L’Universel singulier,’ in Situations IX (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 152-90. 
26 Quentin Meillassoux, Time Without Becoming, trans. Robin Mackay (Rome: Mimesis International, 2014), 
28. I realise that Meillassoux’s argument could be challenged by refuting its simplicity. Entities, especially 
humans, are always complex. Simply adding another property to Meillassoux’s entity (X and non-X in addition 
to A and non-A, for example) would jeopardize the very thought of the contradiction he is unmasking. However, 
we are dealing here, very precisely, with the simplicity of a universal applicable to all humans and it is the 
reduction to this simplicity that needs to be challenged not in relation to space (in which case the entity could be 
construed, most dangerously, as a totality amidst many other totalities), but in relation to time.  
27 I realise I deliberately reverse Meillassoux’s argument: if Meillassoux says ‘if something is self-contradictory, 
then it cannot change,’ I note in reverse that ‘if something is immutable, it is self-contradictory.’ The reversal of 
the argument is justified in as much as what is targeted here is immutability, the fact that a contradiction (a 
Heraclitean ‘becoming’ as a universal, for example) can perdure over time.  
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contradictory dream or delusion that strangely conforms to the types of spectral universals 
(‘an idem always already to-come above all ipse’) that they themselves discard.  
 
In his critique of the principle of contradiction, Meillassoux goes as far as saying that 
such a generic universal ‘being’ would not only be lacking in temporality (because in its 
eternal flight it embodies a temporality that paradoxically never changes), it would 
effectively be incapable of living or dying. He writes, ‘A contradictory being even loses all 
capacity for living and dying—for… its very existence is already non-existence and its non-
existence already exists.’28 There goes indeed Eze and Wiredu’s dream. A universal 
understood as itself and its opposite in all eternity could not even take place. It could not 
begin nor end because in beginning it would necessarily also end. It would remain eternally 
immutable and changing, a perfect flux excluding and incorporating all possible 
contingencies, a ‘being’ defying death and already dead, a ‘becoming’ shaping and 
abolishing all unpredictable future. This is what a universal that negatively pitches itself in 
relation to the contingent, death and the unforeseeable is all about: a contradiction, that is, an 
impossibility. 
 
Overall, this means therefore that it is impossible to tie together the bio-onto-logical 
with the universal. This does not mean that dreaming of a ‘becoming universality devoid of 
races’ is absurd or pointless. On the contrary, a contradiction such as a ‘generic bio-onto-
logical universal becoming’ in a way makes sense: as Nahum Dimitri Chandler and Fred 
Moten have so clearly demonstrated, you can define it and reason it rigorously29 and as 
Etienne Balibar has so remarkably shown in his own analyses of the universal, you can work 
towards achieving it through individual or collective action by structuring it, for example, as 
‘an ideal always-already “beyond” any simple or absolute unity and therefore a permanent 
source of conflict.’30 But however much it offers a reasoned potential, such a ‘generic bio-
onto-logical universal becoming’ unfortunately can never take place. Heidegger already says 
this when he remarks, most simply, that however you understand it, a contradiction over time 
cannot be at all.31 In other words, a contradictory unity can indeed be dreamed and 
constructed in any given circumstances, but it will always flounder faced with risk, finitude, 
and the utterly unpredictable. As such, anyone who attempts to think a universal principle, 
such as Eze or Wiredu, necessarily puts forward a metaphysical aspiration that might 
highlight how things must be, they do so knowing that these things can never take place.  
 
So the question can no longer be avoided: How can one indeed push further the idea 
of universality in such a way that it ceases to be contradictory, that it stops being an 
                                                      
28 Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Contingency and the Absolutization of the One,’ trans. Benjamin James Lozano, 
conference paper given at Sorbonne-Paris I for the symposium Metaphysics, Ontology, Henology, 13 March 
2011, 13. 
29 Chandler and Moten’s call for an ontology of dehiscence is here indeed exemplary of a recent attempt to 
come up with a specific bio-onto-logical becoming. As Moten writes, referencing Nahum Dimitri Chandler’s 
work: ‘The lived experienced of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand for an ontology of 
disorder, an ontology of dehiscence, a para-ontology whose comportment will have been (toward) the ontic or 
existential field of things and events.’ Fred Moten, ‘The Case of Blackness,’ in Criticism 50:2 (Spring 2008), 
177-218. See also, Nahum Dimitri Chandler, ‘On Paragraph Four of ‘The Conservation of Races,’ in CR: The 
New Centennial Review 14:3 (2014), 255–288.  
30 Etienne Balibar, ‘Ambiguous Universality,’ in Politics and the Other Scene, trans. Christine Jones, James 
Swansen and Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2002), 173. 
31 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), 53. 
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impossibility, just a dream of something that can never take place, let alone unify humanity 
peacefully? In other words, can there be a universal that is not ‘becoming,’ is free of the bio-
onto-logical and yet remains paradoxically human, all too human? This is where I would like 
to propose to go back and re-think the principle of non-contradiction. If one is rigorous about 
this principle, then one needs to rethink it in such a way that it never turns into a spectral 
becoming, for which all of tomorrow has already been absorbed all the while remaining 
contradictorily subjected to bio-onto-logical determinations of time and place. The task is 
difficult because it calls for a logical thinking that is both eminently and universally human 
and yet neither biological nor evolutionary. How is one then to re-think the principle of non-
contradiction, this inalienable universal free of bio-onto-logical becoming? 
 
The radical re-thinking of the principle of non-contradiction is effectively performed 
by Meillassoux in his own critique of universal becoming. He proposes to understand the 
principle of non-contradiction as absolutely contingent. As he says, ‘non-contradiction is a 
condition of contingency…[it] is the condition of a radical chaos, a hyper-chaos.’32 What can 
this possibly mean and how does it affect the way we might understand Eze and Wiredu’s 
universal differently? The simplest way to make sense of this is to begin by reversing the 
tables: instead of imagining a universal that would be fixed across time, we need to think a 
universal as always changing unpredictably. The crux of this drastic reversal is simply that a 
universal, such as ‘becoming,’ for example, is effectively structured by a type of Leibnizian 
principle of sufficient reason33 that renders it constant across time. In other words, there can 
be no universal that perdures over time if its perdurance doesn’t continue to make sense over 
time. This is precisely why it is a principle of contradiction: the contradiction sustains itself 
as a contradiction without end, its cause producing its effect not ad aeternam, but ad 
infinitum.34 Meillassoux goes against this idea and proposes to understand the principle of 
non-contradiction as having no reason whatsoever, an absolute35 universal that knows no 
                                                      
32 Meillassoux, Time Without Becoming, 28. 
33 This principle states that nothing happens without structural laws. For example, for every fact ‘A,’ there must 
be a sufficient reason why ‘A’ is the case. Or put differently, ‘from nothing, nothing comes’ (‘ex nihilo, nihil 
fit’), which simply means that an existing thing cannot have nothing as their cause. See G.W. Leibniz, 
Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1989), 
especially 412-44. 
34 The difference between infinity and eternity cannot be explored here in any satisfactory depth. Suffice to say, 
for clarity’s sake, that infinity stands for what knows no bound or is larger than any known number; eternity by 
contrast, is strictly a-temporal, hence the importance of perceiving it alongside universality, as being what is 
strictly devoid of spatial particularities. 
35 Every time the word ‘absolute’ or later, the word ‘eternal’ is mentioned, it is crucial to remain if not skeptical, 
at least a little circumspect. Meillassoux goes to great lengths to assert his magisterial capacity to access an 
‘absolute’ free of the correlationist circle. While he polishes proofs of this access, I think we ought to keep in 
mind that any articulation of an ‘absolute’ necessarily assumes the absolutely changeable character of thought 
that necessarily goes with it and this, as long as they are minds thinking. To say this does not return us inside the 
correlation, for which an absolute is always relative to thought. It simply affirms, on the contrary, the absolute 
contingency of any thought of the absolute, which should really be the first condition of any reflection of an 
absolute as hyper-chaos. As the evidently correlationist Heidegger poignantly intimates at the edge of the 
correlation: ‘We cannot deduce the unchangeability of our mind and of its basic constitution as absolutely 
remaining the same. We are stuck with this fact and therefore with the contingency and unconditionedness of 
the factual.’ Martin Heidegger, Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. T. Sheehan (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010), 37. 
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sufficient sense; that is absolutely contingent—hyper-chaos itself.36 But how can one make 
sense of a universal without at least a semblance of reason, such as “unpredictability,” for 
example? 
 
Firstly, it is clear that something that has no reason whatsoever is not something that 
is irrational. On the contrary, the principle of non-contradiction is clearly rationality itself (A 
cannot be non-A), it is most simply what is observable, self-evident and/or scientifically 
knowable. However, it can only be so, if it is consistent with a world, nay a universe, that is 
not supremely logical and constant over time, such as ‘becoming,’ but entirely chaotic, that 
is, without cause, telos, or structuring flux. As Meillassoux says, ‘an entirely rational world 
would be by that very token entirely chaotic: such a world is one from which the arbitrary 
belief in the necessity of laws has been extirpated…’37 In other words, what is rational is 
what is entirely chaotic and anything that appears logical and necessary is just an arbitrary 
belief put out from finite ontical perspectives. Rationality is here not what is consistent, but 
what conforms to life itself, that is, with something that is utterly contingent, even if it 
appears to us as obeying specific logical laws (such as the laws of thermodynamics, gravity, 
or relativity, for example). Extirpated from these arbitrary beliefs, rooted out from these 
logical laws, the world or more precisely the universe thus reveals itself finally in all its 
rationality, but of a rationality utterly without reason, rational hyper-chaos in act. 
 
So when it comes to thinking a universal principle, we therefore need to get rid of the 
Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason that sustains ‘becoming.’38 In the context of a 
principle of non-contradiction understood as entirely chaotic and without cause, this 
sufficient reason becomes indeed meaningless because all manifestation appears rationally, 
but without reason. Free from this arbitrary belief, free from seemingly logical laws, the 
universality of hyper-chaos, this absolute non-contradiction becomes the very rational power 
that creates whatever is and this without reason whatsoever. In this way, to formulate a 
universal is to deny it sufficient reason, to cut out the fact that it might be a looming 
becoming that perdures over time and reinstate it for what it is, namely something entirely 
rational precisely because conform to the radical contingencies of life itself.39 
 
                                                      
36 Meillassoux understands hyper-chaos in a specific way. He writes: ‘We traditionally conceive of two different 
kinds of chaos: On the one hand, there is a necessary chaos, which we identify as comprised of a series of 
necessary processes that exist, but are ultimately devoid of any purposive ends… And on the other hand, the 
concept of chaos can also denote a random chaos, in so far as its processes are governed by chance encounters 
between independent particles or causal series.’ A good example of a type of chaos that intertwines these first 
two apperceptions would be the Caribbean chaos in Antonio Benítez-Rojo, The Repeating Island, trans. James 
E. Maraniss (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). Having discarded these chaoses, Meillassoux then 
proceeds to explain what he understands by hyper-chaos: ‘The chaos of which I’m thinking here is capable of 
altering or even reconstituting the laws of nature themselves. I label this extreme kind of chaos—which is 
neither deterministic nor random—a hyper-chaos’ (Meillassoux, ‘Contingency and the Absolutization of the 
One,’ 13). He makes the same distinction between empirical and absolute contingencies in Quentin Meillassoux, 
After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum 2008), 62. 
37 Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Potentiality and Virtuality,’ trans. Benjamin James Lozano, in Collapse II (March 
2007), 76-77. 
38 Especially because such a principle is always already tied to a metaphysical dimension ruling over 
universality, as in for example, when Leibniz says: ‘This final reason for things is called God.’ Leibniz, 
Philosophical Papers and Letters, 639. 
39 Inversely, this also means that the principle of sufficient reason is therefore entirely irrational because it 
conforms to artificial ontical and finite perspectives. See Meillassoux, ‘Potentiality and Virtuality,’ 76-77. 
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In this way, Meillassoux’s denial of the principle of sufficient reason is therefore a 
way of revealing the very rational hyper-chaos that structures everything and is embodied40 in 
the principle of non-contradiction. Through such an entirely rational principle, reason thus 
finds its true ‘order,’ but this ‘order’ is no longer a transcendental a-historical/a-spatial entity 
(God, Spirit, Nature, for example) or a device that dis-jointedly perdures across time (being, 
becoming, trace, différance, for example). These classic entities are essentially ‘always 
already’ structured by principles of sufficient reason that sustain themselves by 
contradictorily incorporating all that they are not. Isn’t this exactly, what différance, for 
example, is all about: it differs/defers everywhere and at each moment, structurally hiding a 
secret—the radically Other—‘always already’ with sufficient reason.41 The non-irrational 
‘order’ that Meillassoux proposes instead is free of such perduring structuring reason. It no 
longer needs to sustain itself ‘always already.’ It is, most simply, a hyper-chaos without cause 
or telos, ground or gravity. As Meillassoux says: 
 
‘The refusal of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not the refusal of reason, but the 
discovery of the power of chaos harboured by its fundamental principle (non-
contradiction), as soon as the latter is no longer supplemented by anything else—the very 
expression ‘rational chaos’ from that moment on becoming a pleonasm.’42  
 
Giving up on reason is effectively the first step towards rationalism, but a paradoxical one: it 
is a rationalism that explain why things are indeed without reason. In this new order that isn’t 
one strictly speaking, absolute contingency thus becomes the only material necessity,43 that 
is, it becomes the only thing that ‘is,’ and will continue to ‘be’ for ever and this even after the 
last man dies.44  
                                                      
40 Inevitably, the question here is this: how does the principle of non-contradiction ‘embodies’ hyper-chaos? In 
order to address this issue, Meillassoux resorts to a number of strategies, none of which is, of course, entirely 
satisfactory: for example, the most basic element of non-contradiction would be either a meaningless 
mathematical sign (Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the 
Meaningless Sign,’ trans. Robin Mackay, conference paper given at Freie Universität (20 April 2012), 
unpaginated) or the creative poetic gesture that gives the unique Number (Quentin Meillassoux, The Number 
and the Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarmé’s Coup de Dés, trans. Robin Mackay (New York: Urbanomic 
Sequence Press 2012). There is unfortunately no space here to critically engage with these solutions. For a 
commentary, see Vincent van Gerven Oei, ‘By any language necessary: Quentin Meillassoux and the Question 
Concerning Signification in Philosophy,’ in Quaderna 2, unpaginated. 
41 Developing this point, unfortunately, goes beyond the scope of this essay. However, I will simply add this: In 
his essay, ‘The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils,’ Derrida shows that in order to 
assert that there must be a reason, Leibniz’s principle first needs to assume that an essence exists in order for it 
to be rendered. With such a deconstructive move, Derrida unwittingly swaps the abyssal question of being for 
another abyssal issue, that of the radically Other lurking behind or beyond this reason. Such a swap shows that 
Derrida and his famous cypher still remain under the empire of Leibniz’s principle. See Jacques Derrida, ‘The 
Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils,’ trans. Catherine Porter and Edward P. Morris, in 
Diacritics 13:3 (Autumn 1983), especially 7-10. 
42 Meillassoux, ‘Potentiality and Virtuality,’ 76-77. 
43 Meillassoux distinguishes a logical necessity that would be the result of probabilistic reasoning (Kant and 
Poper’s interpretation of Hume’s billiard ball, for example) from a materialist necessity that would be 
inaccessible to probabilistic reasoning. The latter is obviously what is at stake when referring to absolute 
contingency. On this topic, see Meillassoux 2008, 87-101 and for a clear exposition of Hume’s billiard problem, 
see the first part of Quentin Meillassoux, Science Fiction and Extro-Science Fiction, trans. Alyosha Edlebi 
(London: Univocal Publishing, 2015). 
44 As Mathieu Watrelot says: ‘Contingency isn’t an entity that could exist by itself and that could stand for a 
world apart from necessity. Contingency takes place because there is something.’ Mathieu Watrelot, ‘Quentin 
Meillassoux et l’équilibre du chaos,’ in Zone Critique (Saturday 9 January 2016), unpaginated. http://zone-
critique.com/2016/01/09/quentin-meillassoux-et-lequilibre-du-chaos (accessed June 2017). 
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This is then the only true universal we can hang on to. It can be stated simply as the 
principle of non-contradiction in as much as it embodies a rational hyper-chaos without 
reason. The crucial aspect of this principle is that the temporal structure it points to finally 
matches its universality. If it is indeed universal, then it must also be eternal. Contrary to the 
impossibly fixed perpetual becoming that Eze and Wiredu dream of, the principle of non-
contradiction embodies a chaos, this time, properly eternal not because of some internal 
consistency keeping it together, but because it proceeds eternally and chaotically without 
reason. As Meillassoux says:  
 
‘Non-contradiction clearly acts as an eternal principle, guaranteeing that anything is 
capable of becoming other and therein guaranteeing that everything remains contingent. 
And the eternal value of this law is grounded in the eternal necessity of the contingency of 
the real.’45  
 
Contingency itself is therefore the sole necessity and non-contradiction is what guarantees 
our ability to come into and out of existence, without therein relying on the dialectic of an 
eternal return of being to itself or articulated as a secret radically Other sustaining différance 
everywhere and everywhen. So if we set aside, for a moment, our logical, but arbitrary laws, 
we are then left with a pure contingency that just happens, hyper-chaos chaotically 
maintaining itself as hyper-chaos without reason.46 Who can dream of a more persuasive 
universality, one that states itself purely as A and not as non-A, occurs without reason, 
remains eternally rational and is free of the subjection of time and place without, at the same 
time, contradicting the inherent and inevitable viewpoint from which one identifies and 
articulates it?  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Now inevitably, this final question cannot be avoided: can this universality 
understood as an eternally rational hyper-chaos be used to affect the way races are perceived 
in the future? Returning to Eze’s original question, can we therefore say that this rational 
principle helps to better negotiate the tension between a call for a universal and the need to 
respect the history of races? The answer is ‘perhaps, yes’ and this for one specific reason: an 
absolutely contingent universality, one that isn’t structured by the bio-onto-logical, but from 
which the bio-onto-logical is derived, has at least one advantage: it cannot be understood as 
an overarching spectral entity understood as a promise on the horizon. This is an important 
advantage because a universality that is understood as a constant becoming, that is, as a 
                                                      
45 Meillassoux, ‘Contingency and the Absolutization of the One,’ 16-7. 
46 From this, it is fair to deduce that since hyper-chaos has no arche or telos, it thereby stands for time itself. In 
order to demonstrate this, Meillassoux focuses on the role of simultaneity in Aristotle’s formulation of the 
principle of non-contradiction. He writes: ‘[Aristotle’s] use of the expression ‘at the same time’ is deceptive 
because it makes no reference to the empirical or psychological nature of time, neither of which can experience 
this “instant” that has no spatial character, but nonetheless gives meaning to the sentence.’ The simultaneity in 
the principle thus refers to nothing empirical and yet it is true of every empirical object. Similarly, the sentence 
refers to nothing temporal and yet in order to make sense, it needs this ‘time’ that appears nowhere. What we 
then have is the necessity of time as such in as much as it is what deploys being in its absolute contingency. See 
Quentin Meillassoux, L’Inexistence Divine, unpublished PhD Thesis, Université de Paris I, Department de 
Philosophie. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9wQhBuMs-siVV9SRW1hdHQtanM/view (accessed January 
2016), 99.  
 
13 
principle of contradiction that absorbs all future is necessarily plagued by the finite 
particularities that also become, but cannot be understood as universal or eternal. It is 
plagued because what is universal and eternal cannot accommodate what is particular and 
finite. Unable to match the particular, this universal thus becomes spectral, an abstract 
overarching entity dragged from an immemorial past and placed in the future so as to haunt 
the particular and its many idiosyncrasies. Hence Douglass, King, Eze, Wiredu and 
Mbembe’s dream or hope haunting our violent racialized and racist present.  
 
Free from this classic spectrality that never ceases to taunt us, we can now begin to 
rethink Eze’s tension. Understood as a rational hyper-chaos, the universal no longer needs to 
state itself as the non-place or hope for the particular. Properly eternal and universal, the 
principle of non-contradiction points to something unequivocal: hyper-chaos rationally 
perduring as hyper-chaos, without beginning, end, or reason. There is a brute and concrete 
reality to this that cannot be made spectral because it is that from which derives our coming to 
be for no reason whatsoever. So even if we obey some arbitrary realities and laws, the 
universal is not something on the horizon to which we must ethically swear allegiance to 
and/or work hard to enact as soon as possible; it is precisely what allows these arbitrary laws 
in the first place. In this way, the particular derives from the universal and not the other way 
round. It is from the premise of this hyper-chaotic eternity and universality that the particular 
structures itself in all its arbitrary and yet il-logical realities, including human rights and 
racism. Consequently, universality is effectively already here, in the very constitution of what 
makes us human, black, white, or any other logical or illogical, but in all cases, arbitrary 
determination.  
 
Ultimately, the only thing we now have left is, of course, Eze’s rightful call to insist 
on history, but this history is now not leading up towards universality. This history is now 
derived instead from the eternity and universality that is the hyper-chaos of non-
contradiction. Deriving from such a hyper-chaotic rationality, history—and, as Eze reminds 
us, the open-textured understanding of black racial memory in particular—provides not only 
for an ethically informed socio-cultural and political critique of racism, it also opens up the 
possibility of an active subject of history who is effectively better armed to carry out such a 
critique. If there is indeed no longer a spectral universality looming ahead in the future 
imposing its own diktats as the not-yet we need to achieve, then what is there to stop us from 
adhering to the hyper-chaotic universality from which we derive and from such an unusual 
stronghold—because utterly unpredictable—denounce all illogical reasonings about other 
fellow humans? This does not mean that we work in a chaotic manner or that racism needs to 
be fought in unpredictable ways. This simply means that from our common principle of non-
contradiction, we are better positioned to expose the dangerous histories that deviate us from 
what we are: arbitrary determinations and beliefs wedded to spurious principles of reason.47 
Exposing such arbitrariness can only thus let the hyper-chaos out of which they derive from 
shine through for the first time. This is the only purpose of a history finally understood as 
free not only of all spectrality, but also, of all arché and all telos. 
 
                                                      
47 We believe in these arbitrary, but logical histories because they make perfect sense and they do so because 
they derive from what has no reason whatsoever. As Meillassoux says: ‘The perfect “logicity” of everything is a 
strict condition of the absolute absence of reason for anything.’ Meillassoux, Time Without Becoming, 28-9. 
